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This thesis develops a database and makes projections of fuel tanker vessels
available between now and 2010 that can support U.S. forces in wartime. The United
States Transportation Command and Military Sealift Command must ensure there are
sufficient fuel tanker vessels to transport fuel to the forces in a dual multi-theater war
(MTW). Once the available assets are known, then DOD can determine the adequacy of
the number of vessels based on the fuel requirements. These vessels are of two
categories: DOD organic assets and commercial fuel tanker assets.
What this thesis shows is that DOD assets will remain virtually the same for the
next ten years but the number of U.S.-flag tanker vessels will decline dramatically. In a
dual MTW scenario there will not be enough DOD or U.S.-flag tanker vessels available
to meet demand. DOD must consider an alternative policy of outsourcing to foreign flag
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The United States military faces many challenges in the next decade. Some of
these challenges include but are not limited to budget constraints, readiness, retention,
technological innovation, and political changes. In order to meet some of these
challenges the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) developed Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010). JV
2010 develops four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full
dimensional protection, and focused logistics. In order to achieve dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, and full dimensional protection, logistics must be responsive,
flexible, and precise. To accomplish this type of logistics, the Service and Defense
agencies will work jointly and integrate with the civilian sector to take advantage of
advanced business practices, commercial economies, and global networks. No where is
this more important than in the area of transportation. One key aspect of this is the
movement of fuel to the battlefield. Without the fuel, the forces cannot fight. There must
be enough fuel in a simultaneous dual multi-theater war (MTW). The most likely
scenario would be the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. There must be enough
assets to deliver the fuel and other petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) required in such a
contingency. During wartime, POL requirements for surge (initial delivery and buildup)
and sustainment (long-term continuing requirements) exceed the transport capability of
fuel tankers owned by the Department of Defense (DOD). [Quintanilla] The importance
of sealift is best described by the 1998 MARAD report to Congress:
Sealift is essential to execute this country's forward defense strategy and to
maintain a wartime economy. America's national sealift objective is to
ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources will be
available to meet defense deployment and essential civilian economy
requirements in support of our national security strategy. During national
emergencies, there must be adequate sealift available on a timely basis to
support deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces. [MARAD,
P-3]
A. PURPOSE
This research will develop and analyze a database of current and future fuel tanker
assets available for Department of Defense (DOD) in a dual (MTW) scenario. The
projection of assets will be from January 2000 until the year 2010. The analysis will
divide the assets into two areas. The first area is government assets that are assigned to
the U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command, and the Maritime Administration that includes
the National Defense Reserve Force and the Ready Reserve Force. The second area to be
examined is assets in the commercial sector that includes United States flagged vessels,
vessels under Effective United States Control (EUSC), and foreign flagged vessels. The
objective is to perform a thorough analysis of these two areas in order to provide the
agencies within DOD and other sectors of government the fuel tanker assets available in a
dual MTW.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Question: Will there be enough fuel tanker vessels available to the
Department of Defense to transport petroleum products in a dual Multi-theater War?
Secondary Questions:
1. What are the current and future fuel tanker assets of the U.S. Navy, Military
Sealift Command, and Maritime Administration?
2. What are the current and future fuel tanker assets of U.S. flagged vessels, vessels
under Effective United States Control, and foreign flagged vessels?
3. Is the Voluntary Tanker Agreement a reliable and accurate source of fuel tanker
assets?
Can DOD depend on such information?
4. Are vessels under Effective United States Control available in a timely manner?
5. What are the implications of existing and emerging public law such as the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990?
6. Will utilizing U.S. flagged vessels interfere with the normal day-to-day economic
activities?
7. Can foreign vessels be depended on during a time of war?
C. THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis is divided into five chapters with the first one providing some
introductory information. Chapter 2 gives the background of fuel tanker vessels and their
use in DOD. Chapter 3 discusses current and future assets available to DOD in an
emergency, i.e., military and commercial. Chapter 4 is an analysis of what the current
and future problems are for DOD planners in acquisitioning and activating enough fuel
tanker vessels to meet the requirements in a dual MTW. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis
with recommendations for DOD and suggests further studies.
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS
The expected benefits of this thesis are to provide a current database of current
and future fuel tanker vessels available to DOD in a dual MTW. This thesis will analyze
and determine the availability of tanker assets in order for military planners to execute
Operations Plans (OPLANS) when necessary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. military has a tremendous dependence on distilled bulk petroleum fuel
products. These petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products include diesel fuel,
F76/DFM (ship's propulsion fuel), and JP5/JP8 (aircraft fuel). Because of this
dependency on fuel, DOD has established a significant number of fuel storage,
distribution, and handling facilities around the world. DOD must be able to replenish
these facilities and provide fuel to the battlefield. Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm the
U.S. military has seen a significant increase in smaller contingency operations (Bosnia
and Kosovo) and numerous humanitarian operations. The forces must have fuel to
conduct these operations. The best and most reliable way to provide this fuel is through
the use of sealift. The U.S. must be able to move bulk fuels across the seas to the
battlefield. The best example of this was the conflict with Iraq. During this war 6.1
million tons of POL were delivered: 2.4 million tons in phase 1, 1.4 million tons in Phase
2, and 2.3 million tons in phase Desert Storm. [Holt] Fortunately for the U.S. and allied
forces the facilities and infrastructure of neighboring countries was made available during
the crisis. Also, the crude oil and refineries were within a reasonable distance to the
battlefield. However, this may not always be a correct assumption. A good example of
this is recent operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Fuel had to be shipped via small foreign
flagged tankers and barges because of the poor infrastructure and accessibility. No matter
the situation or location, fuel must get to the forces to allow them the logistical support to
accomlish the mission.
Sealift capacity for DOD comes from ships operating in commercial trade,
commercial ships under long-term charter to DOD, government-owned "surge" ships
maintained by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in a fast response deployment status
and Ready Reserve Force (Surge) ships as maintained in reserve status by the Maritime
Administration (MARAD). [DTJ, April 1999] This sealift capacity provides various
types of cargo capacity, but this thesis is focused primarily with tanker capacity for fuels.
This chapter will discuss the levels of logistic support, concept of operations of
the use of fuel tankers, an in-depth look at the Defense Transportation System (DTS),
types of tankers used by DOD, and finally how DOD goes about acquisitioning and
activating these vessels.
B. LEVELS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
In most military operations the level of logistic support can be divided into three
levels: strategic logisitics, operational logisitcs, and tactical logistics. Specifically, these
three levels consist of the following:
1. Strategic Logistics
This level encompasses the nation's ability to display and sustain its operating
forces in executing the National Military Strategy (NMS). In terms of marine
transportation this is called intertheater sealift. Basically it is the movement of supplies
(fuel in this case) from the United States to the theater of operation. It may also come
from other areas of the world, but in order for it to be intertheater, by definition it must
come from outside the area of operations.
2. Operational Logistics
This level of logistics involves coordinating and providing intratheater logistic
resources to operating forces, and primarily concerns the Unified Combatant
Commanders and the Service Component Commanders. Once the supplies have reached
the theater of operations via the intertheater sealift they must then be distributed as
allocated to the local forces.
3. Tactical Logistics
The tactical logistics level focuses on planning and support within and among
operating units of the task force or battle group. [NDP 4]
These three levels hold true for the military services within DOD. To develop an
understanding of how it works, the concept of operations for a Carrier Battle Group
(CVBG)/Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is discussed next.
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The concept of operations for providing fuel to the naval forces occurs in three
stages similar to the levels of logistic support discussed in the previous section. The first
stage involves the use of merchant shipping to move the fuel into the theater of operation
or to a forward base. This is done using organic ir contract tankers. The next stage
occurs when a Navy or MSC vessel receives the fuel at the forward base and is ready to
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deliver the fuel. The third stage is when the fuel is actually delivered to the CVBG or


















Figure 1 . Three Stage Logistics Support Train
The focus of this thesis will be on the first stage. This is where commercial
shipping will have to be utilized and it is where the U.S. military is most vulnerable in a
dual MTW. During wartime, POL requirements can be divided into two categories: surge
(initial delivery and buildup) and sustainment (long-term continuing requirements). In
order to meet these POL requirements, DOD has developed a transportation system
consisting of military and commercial resources to ensure the required amounts of fuel
get to the right place, at the right time, and in the right amount. This will be discussed in
the next section.
D. DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The Defense Transportation System (DTS) is that portion of the nation's
transportation infrastructure that supports DOD common-user transportation needs across
the range of military operations. [JP4-01] The DTS is depicted in Figure 2.
DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Figure 2. Defense Transportation System (DTS)
As can be seen by Figure 2, the DTS incorporates military, commercial, and host-
nation resources if the transportation system is to be modern, responsive, and flexible.
The most dependable of these resources is the military resources, followed by
commercial, and then host nation. Host-nation resources will not be discussed in this
thesis, as it is a complex separate issue. However, military planners must take into
consideration host-nation resources as part of the OPLANS.
In order to coordinate the entire transportation process, the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) is assigned the mission to provide air,
land, and sea transportation for DOD, both in times of peace and in times of war. [JP 4-
01]
The components that comprise USTRANSCOM are provided in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Components ofUSTRANSCOM
The duties ofUSTRANSCOM can be summarized in the following paragraph:
Exercises combatant command (command authority) of the transportation
assets of the military departments and is the DOD single manager for
transportation. It aligns traffic management and transportation single
manager responsibilities to achieve optimum responsiveness,
effectiveness, and economy. USTRANSCOM establishes and maintains
relationships between the DOD and the commercial transportation
industry. Geographic commanders in chief (CINC's) who have
transportation assets assigned to their command should ensure the assets
are managed, controlled, and capable of full integration into the DTS.
[JP4-01.2, p. II-5]
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The key player for sealift is the MSC. As a component ofUSTRANSCOM, MSC
provides strategic common-user sealift necessary in military operations. Under normal
peacetime conditions, the MSC force consists of government-owned ships as well as
privately-owned ships under long-term charter to the DOD. During periods of increased
requirements, MSC can procure additional voluntary charters through the Air Force
Working Capital Fund-Transportation or by selective activation of Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) vessels. [JP 4-01] The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) also plays a major
role in this process. Their only concern is for the movement of petroleum products. The
MSC charters the ships and retains operational control of them, responding to the
scheduling requirements provided by DESC. Shipments by ocean tanker are managed
centrally in the Bulk Fuels section of DESC. DESC also closely monitors the loading
and unloading times of the tankers and initiates claims to collect demurrage from
suppliers who cause delays [DESC]. The types of vessels that MSC may charter will be
discussed next.
E. TYPES OF TANKERS
There are various types and sizes of fuel tanker vessels. Initially, a couple of
definitions need to be clarified. First, sealift forces are those militarily useful merchant-
type ships available to the DOD to execute sealift requirements of the National Military
Strategy (NMS) across the range of military operations. [JP4-01.2] The key to this
definition is "militarily useful". There are many U.S. -flag and foreign flag tanker vessels
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that are operating at the present time. However, not that many are military useful because
of their large size. To be military useful, a product tanker must be large enough (over
35,000 DWT) to carry the required amount of petroleum on one voyage, but at the same
time be able to discharge at a designated port that is capable of this size of vessel.
Terminal space, draft constraints, and product storage space may make some vessels too
large for military usefulness. Therefore, a vessels size of 35,000 to 80,000 deadweight
(DWT) is considered military useful. [Quintanilla] This size limitation will depend on
the location of the conflict and the requirements of the DOD. This will be discussed
more later, but Appendix J provides the current list of U.S. -flag tanker vessels that are
militarily useful.
Another useful definition is "common-user" shipping which is ships engaged in
the transportation of cargoes for two or more Services from one seaport to another or to a
location at sea in the theater of operations pending a decision to move the cargo
embarked ashore. [JP 4-01.2] There are five sources available to DOD to transport fuel
via sealift. They are:
1
.
Government-owned/controlled shipping: these vessels are made up of U.S.
Navy and MSC assets. See Appendix's F and G.
2. Government-owned reserved or inactive vessels: these vessels are of the RRF
and NDRF. See Appendix H.
3. U.S. -Flag shipping: these vessels are owned and operated by U.S. companies.
See Appendix's I and J.
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4. U.S. owned, Foreign flag shipping: these vessels are owned by U.S.
companies but sail (registered) under a foreign flag. See Appendix O.
5. Foreign flag: these vessels are foreign owned and flagged.
See Appendix N. [JP 4-01.2]
Tanker capacities can be classified by two ways: barrels (BBL) or by
(DWT). One barrel equals 42 US gallons. DWT is measured in Long ton (LT) of 2,240
pounds.
Liquid cargo carriers, or tankers, can be classified by what cargo they carry and
size of vessel. Normally, these vessels carry two types of petroleum products: crude oil
and product oil. There is a big difference (and sometimes confusion) on what a vessel
can and cannot carry. The difference explained:
The crude oil carriers thought of as carrying "dirty" cargoes simply
because the crude cargo is incompatible with other petroleum products that
have already undergone some form of refining. To mix the products
would contaminate the refined product with the crude oil. The same holds
true for various types and grades of refined fuel products. Aviation grade
fuels cannot be mixed with heavier diesel fuels and still be used for
aircraft operations, though diesel fuel that has been mixed with aviation
grade fuel may still be usable for vehicles and machinery. [Quintanilla]
A tanker carrying "dirty" (crude oil) cargo will require about two weeks of manual
labor to clean its tank and piping before carrying "clean" (refined product) cargo. [JP 4-
01.2] For DOD this can be a loss of precious time in a dual MTW, and is expensive to
have these tanks cleaned.
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The more that is discussed about fuel tankers, the more the limitations are placed
on DOD to locate and utilize such vessels. The biggest limitation for DOD purposes is
the size of these fuel tanker vessels. Fuel tanker vessels can be classified by three types:
1. Handy Size Tankers
The handy size tanker (6,000 to 35,000 cargo DWT or approximately 48,000 to
280,000 BBLs) are the most military useful. It can carry clean or refined products. The
advantages are their ability to enter most of the world's tanker ports, short time to clean if
necessary and flexibility with the types of cargo they can carry. Disadvantages include
the small capacity and limited availability on the commercial market. These vessels are
what the Navy and MSC currently has in its inventory
2. Medium Size Tankers
The medium size tanker (35,000 to 100,000 cargo DWT or approximately
280,000 to 800,000 BBLs). Most tankers under 60,000 DWT carry clean or refined
product, while those above 80,000 DWT carry dirty or crude oil. The advantages of this
type vessel are they are more readily available and can deliver large quantities of POL
products for DOD. A major disadvantage is that when these vessels carry crude oil it
takes some time to clean and prepare them to carry refined products.
3. Large Crude Carriers
The large crude carriers are the largest class of tankers and are solely dedicated to
the transportation of crude oil. The range in size from 100,000 to 400,000 DWT and
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there are some being built that range from 400,000 to 800,000 DWT. These vessels are
not militarily useful for carrying petroleum products due to their large size. [Jp4-01.2]
This section discussed the type of fuel tankers based on what type of product they
may carry and the size of the vessel. How DOD determines that there is a requirement
for additional tanker vessel capacity required to meet an emergency situation will be
discussed in the next section.
F. VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION
Ships that are part of the Navy, MSC, and RRF are under the control of DOD.
However, most ships that DOD utilize to move petroleum products are not under their
direct control and are in the commercial sector. If these ships are required by DOD in
both peacetime and wartime, then there must be an agreement between DOD and the
private company owner and operator of the vessel. These agreements are called
"charters". "Time" and "voyage charters" are most commonly used to acquire sealift
shipping to meet short-term military requirements. [JP 4-01.2] A voyage charter is a one
time agreement (contract) to move fuel from point-to-point. A time charter is an
agreement (contract) for the use of the services of a vessel for a particular time period.
How does DOD determine the amount of sealift required to transport petroleum
products? The previous section discussed five sources for DOD to utilize shipping fuel.
The intratheater assets are the vessels of the Navy and MSC. There are various
procedures that must be followed for intertheater sealift of fuel to the theater of
operations. Appendix B provides the flow of events. In normal peacetime operations the
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requirements are met or MSC will charter additional ships. In an emergency (wartime)
more assets may be required. However, in Desert Storm the MSC met requirements by
chartering additional vessels. This may be even more difficult in a dual MTW? The
inactive vessels of the RRF and National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) may have to be
utilized. These vessels were not used during Desert Storm. Appendix's C and D provide
the step-by-step procedures required to activate the RRF and NDRF fuel tanker assets.
These vessels may not meet all the demand requirements in a dual MTW. Commercial
shipping would have to be utilized. DOD would have to obtain shipping from the
following sources:
• U.S.-flag commercial charters
• Foreign owned and operated ships, used in accordance with existing laws and
policies
• Ships committed to the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA)
• U.S. owned ships under Effective U.S. Control (EUSC)
• Military useful U.S.-flag ships which are subject to requisitioning [JP4-01
.2]





The assets available to move and deliver fuel in a dual MTW can be are the
following categories:
• U.S. Navy
• Military Sealift Command
• National Defense Reserve Force/Ready Reserve Force
• Commercial
• Voluntary Tanker Agreement
• Other
A discussion of current and future projection of assets available in each category
will be discussed next.
B. ASSETS AVAILABLE
1. U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy assets currently consist of eight fast combat support ships (AOE).
There are two ship classes: Sacramento and Supply. Vital information on each is
provided in Appendix F. The Sacramento Class is the largest underway replenishment
ship in the world and can carry a variety of POL products including DFM and JP5. It is
the older of the two classes. The Supply class can carry the same products, but is a newer
ship. These vessels are not common user vessels. Common user vessels are vessels that
can be used by all Service branches. These vessels are for Navy use only, but can also be
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utilized by allied navies. They are an intratheater asset compared to other vessels
(tankers) that are intertheater assets. The planned service life of these vessels is 35 years.
As can be seen in Appendix F, the Sacramento class is approaching this milestone. The
average age of this class is 32 years old. These ships are old and require much
maintenance to keep them running. One solution to this problem of an aging ship is the
introduction of a new class of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) vessel. This new vessel is
the T-ADC(X). This vessel will be managed and operated by MSC just as other CLF
vessels are. The first delivery will be in FY04 with a total of 12 ships delivered by the
end of FY 2006. The T-ADC(X) will be able to carry fuel, stores, and ammunition. A
major drawback to this ship is that it can only carry 18,000 BBLs of fuel. Because of this
limitation, the Navy will need to continue to depend on the Kaiser Class Oilers for most
of their fuel requirements. These oilers will be discussed in the next section. Currently
the Navy depends on these oilers for much of its refueling requirements. The Navy may
lose its flexibility of using the Sacramento Class AOE when the T-ADC(X) replaces it.
However, at some point in the next 10 years all CLF vessels will probably be managed
and operated by MSC. This will help the Navy alleviate some of its current manning
shortages. These vessels of the MSC are discussed in the next section.
2. Military Sealift Command
The majority of CLF assets are operated by MSC. These civilian-manned vessels
have assumed the role of fueling and supplying the fleet. MSC has five ship programs to
serve not only the Navy, but also the entire DOD. These five programs are:
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• Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force (PM 1
)
• Special Mission Ships (PM2)
• Prepositioning Ships (PM3)
• Ship Introduction Ships (PM4)
• Sealift Ships (PM5)
The only programs that are concerned with fuel tanker assets are PM1, PM3, and
PM5. These programs will be discussed next.
a. Program 1 (PM1)
MSC's Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) is the lifeline to the U.S. Navy
ships at sea. [MSC] These NFAF ships are crewed by civilian mariners and have a small
detachment of Navy personnel onboard to provide communication and other technical
support. This technical support includes the personnel required to land and take-off
military supply helicopters. For Navy underway fuel requirements there are 1 3 underway
replenishment oilers in active service. These oilers are all of the Kaiser Class. Two other
Kaiser Class Oilers are currently being used as part of the prepositioning force.
Information is provided in Appendix G. These oilers are not common user vessels and
only replenish ships that are underway. They provide intratheater support for U.S. Navy
and other allied force vessels. In a dual MTW they would not be used by any other
service within the DOD. The average age of these vessels is less than 13 years old so
they will be operating for approximately 20 more years.
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b. Program 3 (PM3)
MSC operates more than 30 ships in the Prepositioning Program. Of
these, three are afloat prepositioning tankers. The three are part of the Logistics
Prepositioning Ships that support the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
All prepostioning ships are under the operational control of MSC area commands,
directly supporting the Navy's fleet commanders in chief. [MSC] The actual day-to-day
control of the ships is carried out by one of the three MPS squadrons. Information on
these ships is provided in Appendix G and H.
c. Program 5 (PM5)
The mission of MSC's Sealift Program is to provide high quality, efficient
and cost-effective ocean transportation for the DOD and other U.S. government agencies.
[MSC] One area of this program is tanker support. MSC works closely with the Defense
Energy Support Center (DESC) to transport petroleum products to DOD storage and
distribution facilities around the world, as well as to deliver fuel to MSC oilers and other
U.S. Navy fleet oilers at sea. MSC operates approximately ten long-term chartered
tankers to provide 90 percent of all fuel needed by DOD during peacetime operations-
[MSC]. All of these vessels are common user tankers. Seven of these vessels are listed
in Appendix G. Five of the vessels are T-AOT's and two are miscellaneous type vessels.
Vital statistics on these vessels is provided in Appendix J.
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3. National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF)/Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF)
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) was established under Section 1 1 of
the Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946, to serve as a reserve of ships with value for
national defense purposes. These ships can be activated to meet shipping requirements
during national emergencies. [MARAD] A list of ten NDRF preservation ships is
provided in Appendix H. Vessels with military utility or logistic value are held in
retention status and are placed under a preservation program designed to keep them in the
same condition as when they enter the fleet.
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) program was initiated in 1 976 as a subset of the
NDRF to support the rapid worldwide deployment of U.S. military forces. The RRF is
critical to ensuring that our Nation maintains the surge capability to respond unilaterally
to security threats in geographic areas not covered by alliance commitments and
otherwise meets sealift requirements in the event of crisis or war. [U.S. DOT]. The RRF
is a key element in DOD strategic sealift especially in the critical surge period before
commercial shipping can be marshaled. The Maritime Administration manages the RRF
for DOD through contracts with Ship Managers and General Agents who are responsible
for activating, maintaining, manning, operating, and deactivating the ships. [U.S. DOT].
The RRF ships are maintained in a readiness status of 4, 5, 10, 20, or 30 days. Each ship
is expected to be fully operational and ready for sea to sail within the assigned DOD
readiness. Ships in priority readiness (4 or 5 day) have a Reduced Operating Status
(ROS) maintenance crew of 9 or 10 persons and are outported at government or
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commercial berths. [MARAD] This is periodically tested by DOD in no-notice activation
of selected ships. There are currently ten RRF tanker ships. Once RRF vessels are
activated in support of a DOD operation they come under the control of MSC. Vital
information on these ten ships is provided in Appendix H.
Five of the ships in the RRF are classified as Offshore Petroleum Discharge
System (OPDS) tankers. These ships can discharge petroleum products from four miles
offshore without any shore facilities. [U.S. DOT] Information on these is provided in
Appendix H.
One major concern for the DOD is the age of the RRF fleet. As Appendix H
shows, most RRF tanker ships were built in the 1 950's and 1 960's with one being built in
1945. Because of constraints on acquisition funding, this is not expected to improve in
the near future. Another problem is having enough manpower to operate these vessels.
Seafarer people are getting older and fewer people are becoming merchant marines. This
will be discussed more in Chapter 4.
4. Commercial
The importance of the commercial shipping sector cannot be underestimated.
This was evident by operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and continues today in
operations in the Arabian Gulf and Kosovo areas of operations. This may be especially
correct with regards to fuel tankers. The commercial fuel tanker sector can be into the
following categories:
• U.S. Flagged Vessels
• Effective United States Control
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• Foreign Flagged Vessels
a. U.S. Flagged Vessels
U.S.-flag vessels are commercial tankers owned by U.S. companies, their
subsidiaries or U.S. citizens. In today's economic environment of global companies, the
distinction between who owns a U.S. -flag vessel and a foreign flag may be difficult to
determine. By partnering with the U.S.-flag commercial maritime industry, the U.S.
government leverages "assured access" to a total network that includes not just vessels
but also logistics, management services, infrastructure, terminals and equipment,
communications, and tracking networks, as well as a cadre of well-trained, professional
U.S. seafarers and shore-side employees. [U.S. DOT]. The U.S.-flag tanker fleet is
supported by the Alaskan oil trade. Crude oil from Alaska is transported from Valdez to
refineries on the West, East, and Gulf coasts. U.S.-flag tankers transport domestic crude
oil to refineries and refined petroleum products to final markets. Under the Jones Act,
U.S.-flag tankers enjoy exclusive rights to the domestic trade in crude and refined
petroleum products. Domestic shipments of petroleum are the key factor in determining
the size of the U.S.-flag tanker fleet, because U.S.-flag tankers transport only a small
share of imported oil. High cost U.S. ship operators generally have not been competitive
in international oil markets. [Rost]. The global demand for fuel tanker is also significant:
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The global demand for refined petroleum products also has significant
influence on the tanker markets. The retirement of product tankers
without replacement is one issue affecting the available numbers of these
types of tankers. As tanker operators reevaluate their market share and
position, they must determine the business sense of the recapitalization of
their tanker fleets in relation to forecasted future profits. The U.S.
merchant marine industry has abdicated its market share of the global
product tanker trade in favor of exclusive Jones Act trading. The global
commercial product tanker trade, therefore, is almost exclusively the
purview of foreign marine ships. [Quintanilla]
To help understand the U.S.-flag tanker sector, the appendixes in back provide
useful data. Appendix I indicates the total number of U.S.-flag oceangoing tanker vessels
of 1000 gross tons (GRT) or over. This list includes all tankers: product, crude, chemical,
and others. For military purposes Appendix J lists all the military useful U.S.-flag
vessels. As chapter 2 discussed, a military useful vessel is one that between
In 1999 the U.S.-flag product tanker consisted of 63 vessels. Of these vessels, 62
are active and one is in lay-up. This is a decline of 40 ships since the summer of 1 990.
This is approximately a decline of almost 40% in one decade. See figure 1 . In this same
period only 10 replacement product tankers were built for domestic trade. [Kurz]. One
important thing to note is that all of these vessels are in the Jones Act trades with no U.S.-
flag product tanker in the foreign trades. Another problem is the age of the product
tanker fleet. Today, the average age of the U.S.-flag product tanker is 21 years old. The
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Figure 4. Decline of U.S.-Flag Product Tanker Fleet
The decline occurred in a short period of time. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). This law stated that all tankers
carrying petroleum products must be double hulled by the year 2015. Although OPA-90
has played a role in the U.S.-flag fleet's decline, the major impact has come from
diminished demand. The following factors have had a negative impact on demand in the
1990's:
1. Reduced MSC Demand: In 1990 MSC chartered 21 products on term charter
versus five today, which is a 76% drop. Over the past 10 years MSC's spot product
tanker charter requirements are down by at least 50%. These spot charters may be down,.
but MSC still has a valid requirement for them. As Appendix R indicates, MSC
acquisitioned for 79 voyage charters between 1 997 to 1 999 from foreign flagged vessels.
These charters delivered over 13 million barrels for fuel products at a cost of over $25
million dollars. In FY 1999 the number of voyage charters totaled 50. See Appendix S.
Of these 50 charters, 19 were utilized for operations in Kosovo. These 19 charters
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delivered over four million barrels of fuel at a cost of over $16 million dollars. Only two
of these charters were accomplished by U.S.-flag vessels. MSC's product tanker charters
are down over the past ten years but they still depend on them to meet the requirements of
the forces in the battlefield.
2. Petroleum Product Imports: The U.S. continues to depend on the import of fuel
products from foreign countries. These products continue to come into the U.S. at a very
substantial level. The daily average for the decade has remained consistently about two
million barrels per day. Because of this, high level of product imports has negatively
impacted the need to make domestic movements and generally has created a ceiling for
Jones Act product tanker rates.
3. Product Cargo Exchanges: The oil companies today are much more receptive
to exchanging their respective cargoes as there is much greater compatibility between
brands. This increase in product exchanges has come at the expense of waterbome
movements of cargoes. These exchanges have helped eliminate the pollution risk
associated with moving petroleum by water.
4. Oil Company Mergers and Consolidations: The number of oil companies has
decreased due to the various mergers and joint ventures. What this does is reduce the
overall demand of fuel product tankers because of the greater efficiencies created by the
consolidation. [Kurz]
Another reason for the decrease in product tanker demand is the increased reliance
on oceangoing barges for the delivery of product cargoes in the domestic coastwise trade.
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As Table 1 indicates, as domestic product cargoes increased by 5.9 million tons between
1995 and 1997 (up 2%), tanker demand fell by 6.6 million tons (down 12%).
1995 1997 Difference Change
Tankers 57.4 50.8 -6.6 -12%
Oceangoing Barges 54.4 62.2 +7.8 +14%
Note: Tons (millions)
Coastwide Product Trac e Upl%(l[.3 Million Toris)
Domestic Product Trade Up 2% (5.9 Million Tons)
Table 1 . Coastwide Product Trade
While barges can serve effectively in many of the same domestic trades as ocean
going product tankers, including meeting domestic and regional military fuel
requirements, they are less well suited for long haul requirements where higher vessel
speeds are required. [Ibid]
As mentioned earlier, the product tanker fleet consists of 63 vessels with 62 of
these being part of the active fleet. However, this number may be misleading. Not all
vessels carry petroleum as currently 47 of these vessels are in product trade and 15
vessels are participating in the grain trades. Appendix J lists the various ships. Almost
25% of today's product tanker fleet are involved in a non-oil trade. What this indicates is
a lack of Jones Act product demand, and demonstrates that the domestic product tanker
fleet continues to be over-tonnaged [Ibid]. Over-tonnage meaning the supply capacity of
fuel tanker vessels exceeds the demand for this capacity. If the 15 vessels were not in the
grain trade they would probably be in lay-up due to the over-tonnage.
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The numbers above indicate what is currently happening in the U.S.-flag product
tanker fleet. This may change over the next ten years? This is the key question for DOD
planners. Base load demand plus a minimal spot market margin, equates to an industry
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Figure 5. Product Tanker Forecast
The above figure indicates graphically how the continued reduction in fleet size
propelled by OPA 90 retirements compares to a projected, sustained demand for 45
vessels. As can be seen, the supply and demand curves intersect in the 2004 year time
frame. At that time there will be only enough product tankers to service core domestic
requirements. After 2004, the industry faces a deficit situation in that there is potentially
not enough equipment to meet core demand. These projections take into account that
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there are currently no new product tanker vessels on order or being constructed and it is
very unlikely that any contracts will be signed in the near future [Kurz].
To summarize, the main cause of the forecasted shortage fuel product tankers
around 2004 is an assumed lack of construction of new vessels, and the phase out of older
vessels because of OPA 90. Appendix M lists U.S.-flag tankers of 55,000 DWT and
greater that will be phased out in the next ten years. Most of these are not military useful
product tankers because of their large size. However, this lack any type of fuel tanker
may have a great effect in a dual MTW.
The decline in the number of tankers has also had another great effect on the
industry. Just as the number of U.S.-flag product tankers has dramatically declined since
1990, so have the seagoing job opportunities provided by this fleet. There were 6,180
billets provided by the tanker fleet in 1990. This compares with 3,840 in 1999, almost a
40% decline in one decade. (See figure 3). As the number of seagoing billets lessen, the
number of qualified seagoing mariners will also lessen. This has a tremendous impact on
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Figure 6. Decline in Tanker Billets
b. Effective United States Control
Effective U.S. Controlled (EUSC) tankers are those vessels that fly the
flag of Bahamas, Honduras, Liberia, Panama, or Republic of the Marshall Islands and are
available for use by the DOD during war. These vessels are U.S. owned, but are
registered in their respective countries. A list of these ships is provided in Appendix O.
There are no tankers from Honduras currently on this list. MARAD is responsible for
providing U.S.-owned foreign flag ships for military support in time of war and will
nominate such ships to meet each requirement stated by MSC. MSC, in conjunction with
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Mobility and Sealift (N42), will determine the
military suitability of those ships nominated. [JP4-01]
What does this EUSC really mean? Four Things:
• Access by normal charter or U.S. requisition
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Requisition requires Presidential declaration of national emergency (not since
WWII)
Law of flag state does not impeded requisition
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Figure 7. EUSC Tanker Fleet
c. Foreign Flagged Vessels
Appendix N lists major merchant tanker fleets of the world. The U.S. lags
behind many countries. The top four countries by dead weight tons (DWT) is provided in
Table 2.
Countrv # Ships GRT (000) DWT (000)
Liberia 698 38.820 57,659
Panama 985 27396 47.516
Greece 262 19.398 25,516
Bahamas 249 12.952 23,670
Table 2. Top Four Tanker Fleets in the World
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All of these countries except for Greece have vessels in the EUSC that can be
utilized by DOD in a war. These countries have many more ships for a variety of
reasons. These reasons include lower construction costs, lower crew wages, lower tax
rates, less government regulations and lower safety standards. These registries may not
require the same level of protection for seafarer health, welfare and safety as on U.S. -flag
vessels. [U.S. DOT] The major question is can the DOD depend on foreign flagged
vessels in peacetime and wartime. This will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.
5. Voluntary Tanker Agreement
The Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) is an agreement established by the
Maritime Administration to provide for U.S. commercial tanker owners and operators to
voluntarily make their vessels available to satisfy DOD needs. It is designed to meet
contingency or war requirements for point-to-point POL movements and not to deal with
capacity shortages in resupply operations. [JP 4-01.2] It was established in 1951, revised
in 1983, and is reapproved biennially. A list of these ships is provided in Appendix K.
The activation procedures for the VTA are provided in Appendix F. The VTA will be
activated ifMARAD determines the following:
• A tanker capacity emergency affects the national defense
• Defense requirements cannot be met by chartering
• Defense requirements can be met more efficiently by activating the VTA then
by requisitioning ships [JP 4-01.2]
There is some debate about whether these ships will be available to DOD in a
contingency operation. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
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6. Other Vessels
For the purposes of this thesis, other vessels are those vessels that may be
available to the DOD during a military operation. These vessels may come from NATO
and South Korea. Appendix Q is a current list of the NATO flag tanker fleet. Appendix
R is a list of possible Korean flagged ships that would be provided in a contingency
involving the Korean peninsula. The ships listed in Appendix Q are of different sizes and
product carrying capabilities. NATO member governments have agreed to make some of
their national shipping assets available to the U.S. in order to aid in meeting emergency
requirements in support of their own nation or other signatories of the North Atlantic
Treaty. [JP 4-01] The Republic of South Korea has committed to providing a small
group of ROK ships. The vessels listed in Appendix R would be available exclusively
for DOD in a military operation. However, there are only 12 of them and the sizes are
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Figure 8. NATO Flag Tanker Fleet
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The importance of fuel tanker vessels in both peacetime and wartime cannot be
underestimated. Sometimes it is taken for granted the ease at which fuel is provided to
the forces. In a dual MTW these assets become extremely vital to the operations.
The transition from peace to conflict represents a critical period for
sealift. Management of the transition during this period will have a
significant effect on the success of deployment and sustainment missions
assigned to sealift. Lost time is rarely made up, and it is particularly
during the transition period that time is lost. Lost time can be attributed to
misperceptions about the speed with which the DTS in general, and sealift
in particular, can transition from a relatively small peacetime force to a
major military force. Depending on the mode of acquisition (discussed in
chapter II), ships may be delayed for significant time periods before they
can be considered as active sealift vessels. [JP 4-01.2, p.VIII-1]








Table 3. Sealift Asset Availability Times
The three fastest modes are ROS and RRF (government-owned) and charter
(commercial-owned). One concern is the last three modes of VTA, requisitioning, and
MDRF have never been tested in a contingency operation. During this transition from
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peacetime to wartime, several factors may complicate the rapid accumulation of sufficient




The frequency of reserve ship test activations and exercises
2. Maintenance effort expanded on reserve shipping
3. Shipyard capacity to activate large numbers of ships
4. Availability of trained crews, spare parts, and logistic support
5. Availability of militarily useful shipping on the world charter market,
6. Restrictions on the activities of foreign flag ships by their respective national
governments [JP 4-01.2]
As an example of the importance of liquid cargo carriers one must look at what
happened during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. At the outbreak of hostilities on 16 January
1991, the MSC force numbered 43 tankers: 25 moving POL, 11 serving as floating
storage vessels in theater (7 for fuel and 4 for water), 6 for refueling operations, and 1
OPDS vessel. During the entire operation, MSC used 69 tankers: 4 RRF, 38 U.S.-flag,
and 27 foreign flag. [Holt] MSC used three main sources of vessel capacity during this
operation. In a dual MTW they would be utilized in the same manner. Because of this,







B. READY RESERVE FORCE
It is foreseen the RRF has two main problems: the age of the vessels and the
manpower required to operate these vessels. As mentioned earlier, the 10 tankers in the
RRF are considered old with most being built in the 1950's and 1960's. The cost to
maintain these in a ROS is considered expensive. Another concern is that it has not been
determined is if these ships can operated underway for long periods of time, such as a
dual MTW. The other problem is manning.
The RRF has a natural limit, one that is determined by the size of the
commercial fleet. The availability of both merchant sailors and shipyard
capacity depends upon the total fleet of tankers. If the overall fleet
declines too much, not enough merchant mariners would be available to
operate RRF tankers, and enough shipyard capability to activate the
reserve tankers in a timely fashion may not exist. Under such
circumstances a relatively large RRF would not be feasible. Even if
maintaining a large number of tankers in the RRF is cheaper than
subsidizing them in commercial operations, the RRF is not necessarily the
best policy choice. [Rost]
If the active commercial fleet continues to decline, as appears likely, unemployed
or underemployed sailors will switch occupations. Additionally, it is expected more
commercial yards will close. Furthermore, in an era of increasingly austere defense
budgets, a large tanker RRF simply may not be affordable. [Rost] The RRF will play an
integral role especially in the early stages of a contingency. However, RRF can not meet




Like other profit-oriented corporations, vessel owners will register their ships
under the U.S.-flag only if there is a measurable economic benefit to their shareholders.
Because of higher U.S. construction, maintenance, environmental, and safety standards, it
almost always costs more to operate U.S.-flag vessels than it does to operate foreign flag
ships. [Navy League]
Unfortunately, America's maritime industry is now in extremis, and no bailout is
likely, unless and until there is a sea change of attitude in the administration, in the
Congress, and among the American people. [1999 Almanac] The U.S. is the largest
trading nation in the world, but U.S.-flag vessels carry less than three percent of its
foreign trade. Overall, it is concluded the U.S.-flag tanker vessel fleet is aging and
declining.
Commercial tanker capacity under U.S.-flag has been declining and is expected to
continue doing so in the next few years. In the event of a major armed conflict, it is
unlikely that U.S.-flag tankers would be capable of providing adequate logistical support
for both U.S. armed forces and essential economic activity. [Rost]
In an interview to Seapower magazine, Mr. Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Administrator of the
Maritime Administration is quoted as saying "the U.S. is better prepared today to meet
the sealift requirements of a crisis comparable to Desert Shield and that the U.S. has the
surge and sustainment capacity that we would need. [Seapower] Since the Gulf War
there has been great improvements in sealift capabilities for the armed forces.
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Unfortunately, these improvements were not in the tanker vessel capacity. In fact, it has
declined dramatically and probably will continue to do so. Of nine U.S.-flag tankers
chartered by MSC during the Gulf War, only three are still trading today. [Kurz] Chapter
III indicated that it is expected after 2004/2005 there will be a shortage of U.S.-flag
tankers to meet U.S. domestic needs. This decline in the number of vessels will reduce
the pool of skilled labor and the U.S.-flag capacity will not be available in a dual MTW.
D. FOREIGN FLAG
Many nations have been building an international maritime presence as a means
of projecting national and maritime visibility and to earn hard currency.
The global ocean tanker trade route architecture influences the taker
market through the placement of ships near potential cargoes and
distribution centers. Refined petroleum products emanate from refining
centers throughout the world. In the event of war, the U.S. would be
seeking to contract with tanker operators whose ships were in close
proximity to suppliers of military grade fuels. The market supply of ships
cannot expand to assume the commitments of routine trade and
international emergency concurrently. [Quintanilla]
Although foreign flag vessels were available and chartered during the Gulf War, it
is questionable whether future crisis will have the consolidated international effort that
was the trademark of this war. It is much more likely that future conflicts will lack this
international consensus, thereby making U.S.-flag sealift capacity even more critical.
[Kurz]
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The biggest concern of using foreign flag vessels is can the ships and the crews be
depended on during a wartime situation. The risk of shipping and crewing accessibility is
shown in Figure 9.
Cost
U.S. Navy Ship & Crew
avy Ship/Civil Service Crew
U.S.-Flag Ship/Merchant Marine Crew
(Best "Middle Ground")
U.S. Owned Ship/Foreign Crew
Hied Shipping
Open Charter Shipping
Decreasing Assured Access & Control
Figure 9. Risk of Shipping & Crewing Accessibility
The DOD chartered foreign flag vessels in a number of roles during Desert Storm.
However, some myths must be discussed on how well they worked. These vessels were
of all types and not just tanker vessels. These myths are considered to be:
1
.
Cost Less: averaged $50 more per ton than U.S.-flag ships
2. More Efficient: 150 foreign flag ships carried only 21% of cargo; U.S.-flag
ships carried 79% (this may be misleading because there was not enough
information on how this foreign flag ships were actually used)
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3. As Reliable: 13 foreign flag vessels hesitated or refused to enter into the
Arabian Gulf
4. As Safe: 40% were from registries on the U.S. Coast Guard "blacklist" for
safety violations [Kurz]
It has been established that there will not be enough RRF and U.S.-flag capacity
to meet the requirements in a dual MTW. DOD could then activate the VTA and EUSC
vessels as discussed earlier. However, the VTA program appears to have its
shortcomings. First, the program has not really been activated and tested. If so, it would
probably cause great disruption in the commercial market. Two, many of the vessels are
not considered military useful mainly because if their size and type product they currently
carry. Third, not all vessels are of U.S.-flag. It goes back to who controls the vessels.
On paper and for DOD planning purposes it looks to be very useful. However, it must
prove that it works. It must be tested to find out.
The second program that will be necessary to activate in a dual MTW is the EUSC
program. Appendix O lists the ships currently in this program and it was discussed in
previous chapters. This also has some serious shortcomings. They are as follows:
1
.
These requisitioned (or chartered) vessels may come with or without crews.
2. These vessels may lack essential equipment and infrastructure.
3. No assured access commitment for military use equals risk.
4. No controls on flagging outside U.S. control [Kurz]
One of the key questions is will foreign crews be willing to crew a vessel that may
enter into dangerous waters for the purpose of promoting U.S. interests? It will depend
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on the ship, its crew, and the situation. Unfortunately, this makes planning very difficult.
As with the previous program, it looks good on paper but it is really questionable it can
work unless DOD activates and tests it at least once. Another option for DOD is the use
of foreign flag vessels and this will be analyzed in the next section.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As can be seen by the information provided in the previous chapters, the maritime
issues and challenges facing the nation and especially the military are significant and
complex. Changes in world political trends and economies, domestic and international
public sector budget priorities, and state-of-the-art technologies occur constantly. Despite
advances in transportation, the U.S. continues to depend primarily on oceanborne
shipments for its international trade and movement of military supplies during a conflict.
[U.S. Dot]. As the U.S. begins the 21 st century, there are serious doubts and great debates
amongst military planners that there will be enough product tanker vessels within DOD
and under U.S.-flag to meet the sealift requirements of moving petroleum products to the
forces during a dual MTW. This assumption is based on a major war or engagement
some distance from U.S. shores. There appears to be a great amount of optimism on the
part of government and military agencies involved with acquiring product tanker lift that
the world market will respond to the crisis without serious economic or strategic military
penalty. [Quintanilla]
The DOD must address this problem of the lack of fuel tanker vessels that will be
available to them in an emergency. This is important because successful response to
regional contingencies depends on sufficient strategic mobility assets in order to deploy
combat forces rapidly and sustain them in a theater operations as long as necessary to
meet U.S. military objectives. [JP 4-01.2]
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The previous chapters discussed in-depth what assets are available now and in the
future to meet these military requirements. There are not enough government-owned
assets to meet these requirements. By years 2004/2005 there will not be enough U.S.-flag
tanker vessels to meet domestic needs let alone the needs of the military during war.
There are many reasons for this lack of fuel tanker assets.
There are political and economic forces at work today in the
international marketplace that are have devastating and long lasting
consequences for our merchant marine. The deterioration of the
commercial fleet has been evident for years, due to subtle causes which
were never intended to contribute to the loss of this valuable national
asset. Indeed the reasons for the decline are so complex and interrelated,
that neither labor, business nor government agencies can be assigned the
responsibility. Ship companies are coping with a situation not entirely of
their own making. Their higher rates are largely the result of federal
regulatory requirements, safety mandates, the demands of labor and the
absence of an equitable and consistent maritime policy shared by all
governments of the world. The U.S. is damaging its own interests by
letting foreign interests undercut our rates while maintaining rules and
regulations which prevent our carriers from matching them. We can
promote a free enterprise system within our own borders, but failing to
support our own high seas fleet does not correct competitive imbalances
throughout the world. [Smith, p. 134]
There are many things that must be done by the U.S. government and DOD to
correct the situation. This will be discussed in the next section.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD
The problems have developed over many years and cannot be corrected overnight.
It is both a political and cost issue. The DOD and other U.S. government agencies
(specifically the Maritime Administration and the Military Sealift Command) must
44
ensure that there will be enough fuel tanker assets available to satisfy the demands of the
military. Here are a few recommendations in order of priority to solve some of these
problems:
1. Use of Foreign Flag Vessels
The following is the most important, yet most controversial recommendation of
all. Unless something changes drastically in the next four to five years, the demand for
U.S. product tankers may well exceed the supply due to the phase out of current tankers
that do not meet OPA 90 requirements and the lack of new ship building construction.
This demand is in normal economic activity of the U.S. and does not consider increased
demand by DOD during war. Because of this, DOD planners must consider the use of
foreign flag vessels in their OPLANS. There are many positives and negatives with such
an idea as discussed in chapter IV. Unfortunately, DOD may not have a choice in the
next few years. It was surmised during Desert Storm and operations in Kosovo that
foreign flag vessels chartered by MSC can deliver petroleum products to the forces with
limited problems. In a dual MTW, foreign flag vessels will have to be used. There are
not enough U.S. assets to fulfill all fuel requirements. Because of this, DOD (especially
MSC) should develop the partnerships and agreements now with the owners of this
vessels so that in a time of crisis these sealift assets will be available. Chartering foreign
flag vessels does work as can be seen by Appendix's R and S. Developing formal
agreements with these foreign flag vessels will ease the transition from peacetime to
wartime if it becomes necessary. Politics within our government and foreign
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governments may play a key role in this. Public opinion from the tanker industry will
voice doubts about this plan. There are concerns about this recommendation but at the
present time this is the most efficient and effective way to meet the needs of the DOD.
2. Ready Reserve Force
As discussed earlier, the RRF is a vital component of DOD sealift capabilities.
RRF is extremely important in the early stages (buildup) of a conflict until commercial
sources can be marshaled. Some recommendations include:
• Full funding of the RRF annually in order to maintain the present readiness
status of the ships to ensure that the ships are maintained in an appropriate
state-of- readiness so that they can meet the requirements when activated.
• Add/replace ships currently in RRF. There are ten tankers in the RRF. This is
not a sufficient number, it is forseen. Plus, the age of these ships is a major
concern. These ships may have to be underway and operate for long periods
of time. They should be able to do so without maintenance problems. Due to
the age of these ships, they do not comply with the requirements of OPA 90
requiring all vessels carrying petroleum products to be double hull by 2015.
These vessels should be replaced, but budget constraints may not allow this.
3. Maritime Security Program (MSP)
This program currently funds U.S. -flag vessels in order to ensure they remain
U.S.-flag and be available for use by the DOD. This has been very successful to date.
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However, there are no liquid cargo carriers currently in the program. The Maritime
Administration needs to request and Congress needs to approve increased funding so that
fuel tankers can also be in the inventory within this program. This may not be necessary
today, but probably will be by the year 2005 when demand for U.S-flag tankers will
exceed the supply due to the phase out of tankers that don't meet OPA 90 requirements.
Subsidizing U.S. corporations within this program may encourage them buy new tanker
vessels and to maintain a fleet of U.S.-flag vessels. The MSP is the best way for the U.S.
to have total access and control of fuel tanker vessels during an emergency.
4. Voluntary Tanker Agreement/Effective U.S. Control
These voluntary programs look and sound good on paper, but they have never
been tested. There is great concern within DOD and the commercial sector that such
plans work. DOD should activate the ships and cause a potential disruption in the charter
market. This will test how well the commercial sector can respond to the requirements of
the DOD. This would be a very expensive test, but the results will help DOD planners in
the long run. In a time of asutere budgets this may not be practical. If this is the case, a
simulation or "war gaming" must be done. When doing this encourage industry
representatives to participate in the simulation and provide input to the capabilites of the
industry.
5. Public-Private Partnerships
In two reports to Congress, MARAD discussed the significance of developing
such partnerships between the government and private sector. A collective public and
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private approach to support and sustain the Nation's capacity of uninterrupted rapid
deployment of U.S. forces should be developed and implemented. [U.S. DOT] This has
been done well in other sealift areas such as containerships. It has not been done for fuel
tanker vessels. It needs to be developed especially if the projections hold true of a
domestic product tanker shortage around years 2004/2005. The DOD depends on the
commercial sector to meet its needs so develop partnerships such as the MSP within the
industry to meet these needs.
6. Cabotage Laws
The Jones Act and other U.S. cabotage laws that allow only U.S.-flag vessels to
ship products within U.S. waters guarantee our Nation's control of essential
transportation assets and their related infrastructure in both peace and war. {MARAD] A
commitment to these existing laws will help strengthen our sealift operations in a wartime
situation and support our civilian economy. These laws need to remain strong and active,
yet they play only a small part in the overall picture of what fuel tanker assets are
available.
These six recommendations are varied and complex. Unfortunately, the answer
to many of the problems with regards to the number of fuel tanker assets available in a
dual MTW is monetary, both within the government and commercial sector. In this era
of austere budgets for military programs this may be difficult if not impossible to solve.
However, by increasing the budget now this may improve the current programs and solve
future problems for DOD planners. DOD must work with industry to solve these
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problems. This industry includes both U.S. and foreign corporations. Creating
partnerships can assist both parties in meeting their objectives.
C. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
This thesis developed a database of fuel tanker vessels available to DOD in a dual
MTW and discussed why the number if U.S.-flag/U.S. controlled vessels will fall short of
meeting military demand. Now that a current database of current and future assets in
both the government and commercial sector has been developed, what further studies
may be utilized? First and foremost, the Joint Staff and the CINCs must provide what fuel
requirements are necessary in a contingency operation. Requirements from surge to
sutainment must be known. Based on these requirements a projection can be made of the
total number of vessels required. This should solidify the point that there are not enough
government-owned and U.S.-flag vessels to meet the demands of a dual MTW.
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APPENDIX A. SEALIFT RESOURCES
Source: JP4-01
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APPENDIX B. SEALIFT ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PLAN
Source: JP 4-01.2
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APPENDIX C. READY RESERVE FORCE ACTIVATION PROCESS
Source: JP 4-01.2
55
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
56




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
58




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
60
APPENDIX F. UNITED STATES NAVY ASSETS
Class: Sacramento (AOE 1
)
Names: USS Sacramento (AOE 1)
USS Camden (AOE 2)
USS Seattle (AOE 3)
USS Detroit (AOE 4)
Avg Age: 32 years
Fuel Cargo Capacity: 177,000 BBLs
Class: Supply (AOE 6)
Names: USS Supply (AOE 6)
USS Rainer (AOE 7)
USS Arctic (AOE 8)
USS Bridge (AOE 9)
Avg Age: 4 years
Fuel Cargo Capacity: 156,000 BBLs
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APPENDIX G. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC) ASSETS
Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force (PM1)
Class: Kaiser (T-AO)
Total: 13













Avg Age: 8 years




Fuel Cargo Capacity: 18,000 BBLs (DFM 10,500; JP5 7,500)
Prepositioning Ships (PM3)
Total: 3
Names: Kaiser - can be used as a tanker; located in Diego Garcia
Petersburg (OPDS) RRF; OPCON to MSC
Potomac (OPDS) RRF; OPCON to MSC
Sealift Ships (PM5)
Total: 7
Names: Gus W. Darnell, MV
Paul Buck, MV
Samuel L. Cobb, MV
Richard G. Mathieson, MV
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APPENDIX I. U.S. FLAG OCEANGOING SELF-PROPELLED TANKER

















































Note: includes Integrated Tug/Barges; excludes Great Lakes Vessels
*Vessels idle more than 30 days
**Vessels not actively maintained
Source: "U.S. Merchant Marine Data Sheet", Maritime Administration (April 1, 1999)
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APPENDIX K. VOLUNTARY TANKER AGREEMENT
VESSEL FLG TYPE DWT BUILT
CHEMICAL PIONEER US Chemical Tanker 34928 6/1/68
HMI DYNACHEM US Chemical Tanker 51666 9/1/81
MARINE CHEMIST US Chemical Tanker 36524 11/1/70
PAULINA LI Chemical Tanker 29992 9/1/84
PERNILLE LI Chemical Tanker 29974 5/1/84
ROYAL ARROW RM Chemical Tanker 39776 9/1/83
SYLVAN ARROW RM Chemical Tanker 39731 6/1/83
ACOAXET BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35607 8/1/82
AQUIDNECK BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35597 9/1/81
ARCO ALASKA US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 191451 12/1/79
ARCO CALIFORNIA US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 191716 7/1/80
ARCO INDEPENDENCE US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 262376 11/1/77
ARCO SPIRIT US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 262376 4/1/77
ARCO TEXAS US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 91389 6/1/73
ASTRAL LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 127505 6/1/75
ATLANTIA RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 97124 10/1/79
B T ALASKA US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 185119 3/1/78
CHARLES PIGOTT LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 268373 12/1/73
CHEVRON COPENHAGEN LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 268226 8/1/74
CHEVRON FELUY LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 268418 11/1/73
CHEVRON NAGASAKI LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 268230 4/1/74
CHEVRON ZENITH LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 96716 4/1/72
DILIGENCE US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 39886 7/1/77
EAGLE RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 284479 6/1/93
ECLIPSE RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 135134 11/1/89
FAIRBANKS US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 122244 8/1/74
FALCON RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 284089 6/1/76
HARRIER RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 280487 6/1/75
HAWK RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 284449 6/1/76
INTEGRITY US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 39847 12/1/75
JAMES N SULLIVAN LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 134119 6/1/92
JOHN YOUNG LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 170130 6/1/90
JUNEAU US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 122244 5/1/74
KENNETH E HILL BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81273 6/1/79
MAGNOLIA RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 280314 6/1/73
MARINE COLUMBIA US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 138334 5/1/74
RAYMOND E. GALVIN BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35596 1/1/83
S/R BAYTOWN US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 59233 8/1/84
S/R BENICIA US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 175539 6/1/79
S/R LONG BEACH US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 211469 1/1/87
S/R MEDITERRANEAN US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 214861 12/1/86
S/R NORTH SLOPE US Crude Tanker (Any Size) 175298 2/1/79
SAUDI GLORY LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 276368 3/1/74
SAUDI SPLENDOR LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 281595 4/1/75
SOKOLICA LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 145648 6/1/75
VENUS V RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 79999 1/1/81
VESTA PM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81278 12/1/80
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APPENDIX K. (Cont) VOLUNTARY TANKER AGREEMENT
VESSEL FLG TYPE DWT BUILT
WANETA RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81282 6/1/82
WAPELLO RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81283 6/1/82
AMOCO ATLANTAA/IRGINIA BAY US Liquid - ITB 23000 6/1/82
AMOCO COLUMBIA/S CAROLINA US Liquid - ITB 23000
APRIL/GEORGIA BAY US Liquid - ITB 19600 6/1/82
DECLARATION/CARIBE SUN US Liquid - ITB 10524 6/1/70
NEW JERSEY SUN/ISLAND SUN US Liquid - ITB 8540 6/1/75
REPUBLIC/SAN JUAN US Liquid - ITB 6490 6/1/70
TALLAHASSEE BAY/FLORIDA BA US Liquid - ITB 23000 6/1/81
YABUCOA SUN/BORINQUEN SUN US Liquid - ITB 7817 6/1/75
ACUSHNET BF Product Tanker 35586 11/1/81
ALLEGIANCE US Product Tanker 31382 12/1/80
ALMA LI Product Tanker 29999 6/1/88
ANASAZI US Product Tanker 38757 6/1/96
ARCO PRUDHOE BAY US Product Tanker 70899 12/1/71
ARCO SAG RIVER US Product Tanker 70899 5/1/72
CAPT. H.A. DOWNING US Product Tanker 38757 6/1/96
CARLAAHILLS LI Product Tanker 35596 8/1/81
CHARLES B RENFREW BF Product Tanker 78656 6/1/88
CHELSEA US Product Tanker 40368 2/1/75
CHERRY VALLEY US Product Tanker 40302 7/1/74
CHEVRON ARIZONA US Product Tanker 39207 12/1/77
CHEVRON COLORADO US Product Tanker 39213 12/1/76
CHEVRON MISSISSIPPI US Product Tanker 70213 10/1/72
CHEVRON WASHINGTON US Product Tanker 39167 6/1/76
COASTAL HOUSTON US Product Tanker 39973 12/1/73
COLORADO US Product Tanker 31073 2/1/44
COURIER US Product Tanker 35663 1/1/77
DELPHINA RM Product Tanker 39674 5/1/89
DIANE RM Product Tanker 64140 3/1/87
ELBE LI Product Tanker 66800 6/1/84
GUADALUPE US Product Tanker 30369 6/1/45
HMI DEFENDER US Product Tanker 38451 3/1/69
HMI PETROCHEM US Product Tanker 51666 12/1/81
HMI TRADER US Product Tanker 32732 6/1/45
KENNETH T DERR BF Product Tanker 36157 6/1/82
LEADER US Product Tanker 37797 6/1/69
LIMAR LI Product Tanker 29999 6/1/88
LUCY
.
RM Product Tanker 64000 10/1/86
MARY ANN RM Product Tanker 64239 11/1/86
MARY BAY US Product Tanker 76843 6/1/70
MORMACSKY US Product Tanker 39851 2/1/77
MORMACSTAR US Product Tanker 39851 12/1/75
MORMACSUN US Product Tanker 39851 6/1/76
NEPTUNE RM Product Tanker 39800 6/1/89
NEW RIVER US Product Tanker 38289 6/1/96
NILE LI Product Tanker 66807 10/1/81
PAGODA LI Product Tanker 29996 6/1/88
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APPENDIX K. (Cont) VOLUNTARY TANKER AGREEMENT
VESSEL FLG TYPE DWT BUILT
PATRIOT US Product Tanker 35653 4/1/76
PERSEVERANCE US Product Tanker 33991 7/1/81
R HAL DEAN BF Product Tanker 78656 6/1/88
ROVER US Product Tanker 35653 1/1/77
S/R BATON ROUGE US Product Tanker 76843 3/1/70
S/R CHARLESTON US Product Tanker 48890 10/1/83
S/R GALVESTON US Product Tanker 27147 9/1/70
S/R WILMINGTON US Product Tanker 48890 7/1/84
SACONA RM Product Tanker 33187 1/1/82
SAMOSET RM Product Tanker 33235 3/1/82
SANDY BAY US Product Tanker 76843 12/1/69
SAUCON RM Product Tanker 33157 4/1/83
SUZANNE RM Product Tanker 64000 9/1/86
THE MONSEIGNEUR US Product Tanker 38289 6/1/97
TRINITY US Product Tanker 38482 10/1/66
URANUS RM Product Tanker 39171 6/1/88
VEGA RM Product Tanker 39674 6/1/89
VOLGA LI Product Tanker 65686 6/1/81
WILLIAM E. CRAIN LI Product Tanker 155127 6/1/92
ALTA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 140219 6/1/90
ANIA RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94847 10/1/94
BERYL RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94799 6/1/94
BRUCE SMART LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 155150 6/1/91
CAIRO SEA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 134999 6/1/75
CHEVRON ATLANTIC BF Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 149748 6/1/92
CHEVRON EMPLOYEE PRIDE BF Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 156447 6/1/94
CHEVRON MARINER LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 156380 6/1/94
CHEVRON PERTH BF Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 272394 6/1/75
COLORADO LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 86648 6/1/80
CONDOLEEZZA RICE BF Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 135829 6/1/93
CZANTORIA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 146110 6/1/75
ELIANE RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94813 6/1/94
GEORGE SHULTZ LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 136055 6/1/93
J DENNIS BONNEY LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 153010 6/1/91
PACIFIC RUBY RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 84999 6/1/94
PACIFIC SAPPHIRE RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 96173 6/1/94
REBECCA RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94872 6/1/94
SAMUEL GINN BF Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 156835 6/1/93
TANANA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 141720 6/1/92
TRINIDAD SEA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 134999 6/1/74
WABASHA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 81278 6/1/75
WHITE SEA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 132500 6/1/75
WINAMAC RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 80650 6/1/82
NON-US FLAG CODES: BF:=BAHAMAS, LI=LIBERIA, PM=PANAMA,
RM=REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Source: Maritime Administraion
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APPENDIX L. OIL POLLUTION ACT -1990
U.S . FLAG PRODUCT TANKERS (18,000 DWT - 55,000 DWT)
Vessel GRT DWT Built Rebuilt Double Hull Due Year
Coastal Manatee 19.0 30.8 1961 1998 (trading MTBE)
Trinity 20.6 37.9 1966 1999 (trading grain)
Leader 20.9 37.8 1968 2000 (trading grain)
Willamette 20.9 37.8 1968 2000
Overseas Vivian 20.9 37.8 1969 2000
Champion 20.9 37.8 1969 2000 (trading grain)
Concho 18.7 32.7 1945 1970 2000
Marine Chemist 20.2 35.9 1970 2000
Coastal New York 23.5 39.4 1956 1972 2001
Sea Princess 20.8 37.3 1972 2001
Coronado 22.4 39.7 1973 2002
Cherry Valley 22.4 39.7 1974 2002
Chelsea 22.4 39.7 1975 2003
Seabulk Challenger 20.0 39.3 1975 2003
Mormacstar 22.3 39.3 1975 2003
Mormacsun 22.3 39.2 1976 2003
Patriot 21.6 35.1 1976 2003
Colorado 14.9 30.6 1944 1972 2004
Mormacsky 22.3 39.2 1977 2004
Rover 21.6 35.1 1977 2004
Courier 21.6 35.1 1977 2004
Guadalupe 18.0 30.4 1945 1978 2004
S.R. Galveston (crude) 12.8 27.3 1970 1978 2005
Fredericksburg 21.6 39.4 1958 1980 2005
Charleston 21.6 39.4 1956 1980 2005
Allegiance 18.5 34.4 1980 2005
Coastal Eagle Point 26.2 51.0 1960 1981 2006
Coastal Corpus Christi 23.3 51.2 1960 1981 2006
Perserverence 17.5 34.1 1981 2006
Chilbar 21.9 39.4 1959 1981 2006
Chemical Trader 17.1 45.3 1981 2010
Blue Ridge 21.4 42,3 1981 2011
Keystone Texas 21.4 40.0 1981 2011
Coast Range 21.4 40.0 1981 2011
HMI Petrochem 32.3 50.9 1981 2011
HMI Dynachem 32.3 50.9 1981 2011
Chemical Explorer 17.1 50.1 1981 2011
Chesapeake Trader 24.7 43.0 1982 2012
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APPENDIX L. (Cont) OIL POLLUTION ACT -1990
U.S . FLAG PRODUCT TANKERS (18,000 DWT - 55,000 DWT)
Vessel GRT DWT Built Rebuilt Double Hull Due Year
Overseas Philadelphia 21.5 48.0 1982 2012
Groton 22.4 48.0 1982 2012
New York 22.4 48.0 1982 2012
Jacksonville 22.4 48.0 1982 2012
Baltimore 22.4 48.0 1983 2013
Sea Venture 9.9 18.9 1971 1983 2013
Mobile • 22.4 48.0 1983 2013
Philadelphia 22.4 48.0 1983 2013
Delaware Trader 24.7 50.1 1983 2013
Overseas New Orleans 21.5 43.0 1983 2013
Potomac Trader 24.7 50.1 1983 2013
S.R. Charleston 27.8 48.0 1983 2013
S.R. Wilmington 27.5 48.0 1984 2014
Seabilk America 22.1 46.5 1975 1990 2015
Chemical Pioneer 20.0 34.9 1968 1983 Double Hull
Integrity 16.9 39.2 1975 Double Hull
Chevron Colorado 16.9 39.2 1976 Double Hull
Chevron Washington 16.9 39.2 1976 Double Hull
Diligence 16.9 39.2 1977 Double Hull
Chevron Arizona 16.9 39.2 1977 Double Hull
Paul Buck 19.0 29.5 1985 Double Hull
Samuel L. Cobb 19.0 32.6 1985 Double Hull
Gus W. Darnell 19.0 30.1 1985 Double Hull
Richard G. Matthiesen 19.0 32.4 1986 Double Hull
Lawrence H. Gianella 19.3 32.4 1986 Double Hull
Capt H.A. Downing 20.1 34.7 1957 1996 Double Hull
Anasazi 20.0 34.7 1958 1997 Double Hull
New River 19.0 30.8 1959 1997 Double Hull
The Monseigneur 19.0 30.8 1960 1997 Double Hull
American Progress 30.3 45.3 1997 Double Hull
HMI Cape Lookout Shoals 30.3 45.3 1998 Double Hull
HMI Diamond Shoals 30.3 45.3 1998 Double Hull
HMI Nantucket Shoals 30.3 45.3 1998 Double Hull
HMI Ambrose Shoals 30.3 45.3 1999 Double Hull
HMI Brenton Reef 30.3 45.3 1999 Double Hull
Source: Military Sealift Command
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APPENDIX M. OIL POLLUTION ACT - 1990 PHASE-OUT LIST
U.S. FLAG TANKERS 55,000 DWT AND LARGER
Vessel GRT DWT Built
Sandy Bay 34.3 75.6 1969
Mary Bay 38.1 76.2 1970
S.R. Baton Rouge 34.3 75.6 1970
Chevron Mississippi 35.6 70.2 1972
Anchorage 52.5 120.3 1973
Overseas Juneau 57.7 120.5 1973
Juneau 52.5 120.3 1974
ARCO Fairbanks 28.2 62.0 1970
Golden Gate 27.2 62.1 1970
ARCO Spirit 117.5 262.4 1977
ARCO Independence 117.5 262.4 1977
Atigun Pass 74.3 173.4 1977
ARCO Prudhoe Bay 35.6 70.4 1971
ARCO Sag River 35.6 70.4 1972
Keystone Canyon 74.3 124.9 1978
Thompson Pass 74.3 173.4 1978
Brooks Range 74.3 173.4 1978
S.R. Benicia 75.3 172.8 1979
S.R. North Slope 75.3 173.4 1979
ARCO Texas 35.9 90.0 1973
Overseas Boston 60.8 121.7 1974
Overseas New York 44.9 90.4 1977
Overseas Chicago 44.9 90.6 1977
Overseas Ohio 44.9 90.6 1977
MTL Columbia 67.8 136.5 1974
Overseas Washington 44.9 90.5 1978
Denali 83.7 188.1 1978
B.T. Alaska 83.6 188.1 1978
ARCO Alaska 83.6 188.4 1979
ARCO California 83.7 188.4 1980
S.R. Mediterranean 95.2 211.5 1986
S.R. Long Beach 95.0 211.5 1987
PR. William Sound 60.1 124.0 1975
Tonsina 60.4 122.8 1978
Kenai 60.4 125.1 1979
ARCO Endeavor 125.0 2001
ARCO Discovery 125.0 2002
ARCO Resolution 125.0 2002
Source: Military Sealift Command
Phase Out
1 999 (Trading grain)
1 997 (Trading grain)
1 997 (Trading grain)
1998
1 998 Flagged foreign; layup
1 998 (Trading grain)
1 999 (Trading grain)
2000 BP Charter
2000 MTBE Trade only
2000
2000





Lay-up due to fractures
2001 Lay-up due to fractures

















Double Hull - BP Charter
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APPENDIX N. MAJOR MERCHANT TANKER FLEETS OF THE WORLD - 1999
Country No. of ships GRT (000) DWT (000)
All Countires 6,781 182,147 317,337
United States 154 5,189 9,289
Panama 985 27,396 47,516
Liberia 698 38,820 57,659
Greece 262 13,398 25,516
Bahamas 249 12,952 23,670
Malta 352 10,294 18,758
Cyprus 179 4,308 7,386
Singapore 384 9,502 16,690
Norway (Norwegian Int Ship) 289 11,134 19,642
China (Peopls's Republic of) 248 2,071 3,251
Japan 279 7,109 10,507
Phillipines 68 182 280
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 96 1,152 1,968
Marshall Islands 43 3,785 7,045
India 97 2,936 5,110
Hong Kong, China 9 346 642
Turkey 73 583 1,039
Germany 19 178 272
Taiwan 17 901 1,554
Russia 266 1,549 2,235
Korea (South) 106 483 829
Bermuda 33 2,726 4,758
Italy 193 2,242 3,515
Malaysia 112 2,187 3,024
Brazil 76 1,877 3,171
Isle Of Man 72 2,496 4,409
Denmark (Danish Int Ship) 66 1,289 2,182
Iran 24 1,624 3,141
French Antartic Territory 35 1,621 3,088
Kuwait 28 1,939 3,341
Netherlands 59 441 685
Indonesia 123 817 1,297
Antigua & Barbuda 10 28 42
Thailand 89 367 661
Norway 39 1,553 2,749
Romania 8 197 337
Belize 64 350 623
United Kingdom 55 621 1,051
Australia 15 710 740
Egypt 16 212 368
France 25 881 1,570
Vanatu 9 112 160
Sweden 64 534 873
Cayman Islands 18 215 356
Bulgaria 11 151 267
Ukraine 22 63 95
Saudi Arabia 24 344 593
Portugal 30 422 703
Mexico 38 656 1,004
Source: 1999 World Almanac
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APPENDIX O. EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES CONTROL (EUSC) VESSELS
VESSEL FLAG VESSEL TYPE DWT BUILT
FAIRCHEM YONE PM Chemical Tanker 11668 6/1/95
GOLDEN DIANE PM Chemical Tanker 8400 6/1/97
GOLDEN KAY PM Chemical Tanker 8758 6/1/96
PAULINA LI Chemical Tanker 29992 9/1/84
PERNILLE LI Chemical Tanker 29974 5/1/84
ROYAL ARROW RM Chemical Tanker 39776 9/1/83
SYLVAN ARROW RM Chemical Tanker 39731 6/1/83
ACOAXET BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35607 8/1/82
AQUIDNECK BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35597 9/1/81
ATLANTIA RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 97124 10/1/79
BAYWAY LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 50915 6/1/78
CHEVRON ZENITH LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 96716 4/1/72
CONTINENTAL LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 98231 5/1/93
KENNETH E HILL BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81273 6/1/79
PALM BEACH LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 50801 8/1/78
PIONEER LI Crude Tanker (Any Size) 96724 4/1/93
RAYMOND E. GALVIN BF Crude Tanker (Any Size) 35596 1/1/83
VENUS V RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 79999 1/1/81
VESTA PM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81278 12/1/80
WANETA RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81282 6/1/82
WAPELLO RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 81283 6/1/82
WENATCHI RM Crude Tanker (Any Size) 91680 6/1/98
MARLIN LI Ore/Bulk/Oil 15000 1/1/77
TARPON LI Ore/Bulk/Oil 15000 4/1/77
ACUSHNET BF Product Tanker 35586 11/1/81
ALMA LI Product Tanker 29999 6/1/88
CARLAAHILLS LI Product Tanker 35596 8/1/81
CHARLES B RENFREW BF Product Tanker 78656 6/1/88
CHILIBRE PM Product Tanker 3678 3/1/70
DANUBE LI Product Tanker 29900 6/1/90
DELPHINA RM Product Tanker 39674 5/1/89
DIANE RM Product Tanker 64140 3/1/87
ELBE LI Product Tanker 66800 6/1/84
KENNETH T DERR BF Product Tanker 36157 6/1/82
LIMAR LI Product Tanker 29999 6/1/88
LUCY RM Product Tanker 64000 10/1/86
MARY ANN RM Product Tanker 64239 11/1/86
NEPTUNE RM Product Tanker 39800 6/1/89
NILE LI Product Tanker 66807 10/1/81
PAGODA LI Product Tanker 29996 6/1/88
PATTY ANN PM Product Tanker 27380 8/1/74
R HAL DEAN BF Product Tanker 78656 6/1/88
RACHEL B LI Product Tanker 13749 6/1/87
RIO GRANDE LI Product Tanker 15450 6/1/82
RIO NEGRO LI Product Tanker 38711 6/1/75
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APPENDIX O. (CONT) EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES CONTROL (EUSC)
VESSELS
VESSEL FLAG VESSEL TYPE DWT BUILT
SACONA RM Product Tanker 33187 1/1/82
SAMOSET RM Product Tanker 33235 3/1/82
SAN LORENZO LI Product Tanker 4720 6/1/70
SAUCON RM Product Tanker 33157 4/1/83
SEVERN LI Product Tanker 29998 6/1/88
SHANNON LI Product Tanker 29999 6/1/91
STAR BERGEN BF Product Tanker 31502 6/1/77
SUZANNE RM Product Tanker 64000 9/1/86
TIBER LI Product Tanker 29997 8/1/89
TRENT LI Product Tanker 29998 6/1/91
URANUS RM Product Tanker 39171 6/1/88
VEGA RM Product Tanker 39674 6/1/89
VOLGA LI Product Tanker 65686 6/1/81
ANIA RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94847 10/1/94
BERYL RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94799 6/1/94
COLORADO LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 86648 6/1/80
CONSTITUTION LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 81131 6/1/78
ELIANE RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94813 6/1/94
GUARDIAN LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 96920 6/1/92
MARTHA A LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 13500 6/1/86
PACIFIC RUBY RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 84999 6/1/94
PACIFIC SAPPHIRE RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 96173 6/1/94
PATRIOT LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 96920 6/1/92
REBECCA RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 94872 6/1/94
WABASHA LI Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 81278 6/1/75
WINAMAC RM Product Tanker (over 80,000 DWT) 80650 6/1/82
* FLAG CODES ARE AS FOLLOWS: BF=BAHAMAS, LI=LIBERIA, PM=PANAMA,




APPENDIX P. NATO TANKERS
Built GRT DWT
Lima Chemist 1992 2634 3691
Tejo Chemist 1992 2634 3691
Valbrenta 1980 5507 8979
Bow Saphir 1982 12198 14960
Chryssi V 1961 12895 19635
Conger 1991 14332 24349
Dorsch 1991 14332 23031
Fair Delta 1959 12912 20622
Galp Leixoes 1983 12630 18436
NCC Asir 1982 14627 22653
Bow Fortune 1975 17561 27513
Bow Sea 1978 17561 27641
Bow Sky 1977 17561 27642
Bow Spring 1976 17561 27642
Bow Star 1976 17561 27642
Gerd 1975 17598 31004
Kriti Episkopi 1968 14547 24507
Kriti Gerani 1968 13642 24507
Kriti Gold 1972 17505 29494
Maddalena D'amato 1973 17888 30561
Bow Fighter 1982 20478 34376
Bow Lady 1978 18438 31716
Clipperventure 1981 18812 31244
Conquestventure 1980 18812 31264
Courageventure L 1980 18812 31228
Crystalventure 1980 18812 31176
Kriti Akti 1986 24233 40815
Kriti Art 1986 24233 40828
Kriti Champion 1987 26874 44593
Kriti Color 1987 26874 44590
Kriti Filoxenia 1986 26874 44529
Kriti Palm 1986 26874 44471
Kriti River 1986 24233 40828
Kriti Rubi 1973 17822 32075
Lady Ema 1973 18189 31857
Leopard 1985 26113 45372
Lion 1985 26113 45372
Panther 1985 26113 45372
Petrobulk Cougar 1988 26113 45372
Petrobulk Jaguar 1988 26113 45372
Santa Anna 1988 22637 39621
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Vessel
APPENDIX P. (Cont.) NATO TANKERS
Built GRT DWT
Santa Maria 1986 22714 39458
Seaford 1977 18326 31101
Tiger 1985 26113 45372
World Process 1984 17199 29516
World Prodigy 1986 17277 29514
World Produce 1984 17277 29516
World Prologue 1985 17277 29516
World Prophet 1985 17277 29514
Alkyonis 1992 39265 65839
Alpha Intelligence 1982 29149 47807
Andromeda 1984 38267 62943
Argironissos 1992 29506 44708
Condor 1980 26974 53178
Folegandros 1992 29506 44708
Halki 1989 27793 45803
Kandilousa 1995 28507 45236
Kastelorizo 1991 29506 44708
Olga Maersk 1987 27997 49801
Parapola 1994 38792 67155
Psara 1989 27793 45803
Salamina 1991 29506 44708
Samothraki 1989 27793 45803
Serifopoulo 1995 28507 45962
Serifos 1995 28507 45236
Shinoussa 1990 27793 45803
Sporades 1993 39265 65839
St Michaelis 1981 21305 44854
St Nikolai 1982 25117 44854
United Sunrise 1982 29874 54489
United Triton 1981 29874 54531
Velopoula 1993 39265 65839
Source: Military Sealift Command
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Vessel
APPENDIX Q. KOREA TANKERS
Built GRT DWT
Bum IK 1983 4585 7190
Diamond 1982 1643 3662
Fortune Irene 1983 3993 6604
Kwang Yang Pioneer 1991 1876 3704
Mee Yang 1993 1590 3446
Woo Gum 1992 1590 3498
Woo Seok 1996 1989 3861
Bum Dong 1980 9559 17128
Bum Ju 1983 9681 16976
Bum Ken 1980 13159 21962
Fortune Hera 1984 4565 7434
Pancon Ace 1985 4169 6859
Source: Military Sealift Command
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APPENDIX R. MSC VOYAGE CHARTERS 1997-1999
Country Number Dollar Amount Cargo Quantity
Bahamas 10 $3,023,502.00 1,640,000 BBLS/49,766 LT
Bermuda 553,999.00 230,000 BBLS
Cyprus 14 4,990,410.00 2,1 17,806 BBLS/43,921 LT
Danish 520,000.00 235,000 BBLS
Denmark 312,991.00 135,000 BBLS
DIS 2 588,602.00 229,047 BBLS
DUTCH 189,715.00 10,715 BBLS
France . 345,000.00 200,000 BBLS
Greece 855,400.00 620,000 BBLS
Hong Kong 239,399.00 115,000 BBLS
India 150,000.00 260,000 BBLS
Indian 225,000.00 3 1,578 LT
Isle ofMan 188,500.00 120,000 BBLS
Italy 2 248,500.00 30,371 LT
Korean 2 188,000.00 70,000 BBLS
Liberia 14 5,036,485.00 2,301,802 BBLS/30,052 MT/30,128LT
Malaysia 1 220,500.00 250,000 BBLS
Malta 7 1,960,000.00 1,550,000 BBLS
NIS 1 375,000.00 235,000 BBLS
Norway 1 530,280.00 72,946 LT
Panama 6 1,899,532.00 1,068,000 BBLS
SING 2 706,000.00 485,000 BBLS
Singapore 3 1,650,511.00 615,000 BBLS/2 1,974 LT
United Arab Emirates 3 498,750.00 470,000 BBLS/36,975 LT
Total 79 $25,496,077.00 12,952,370 BBLS
30,052 MT
247,660 LT
Source: Military Sealift Command
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APPENDIX S. VOYAGE CHARTERS DURING FY99





Voyage Charters for Kosovo (Product)
Product Amount Total #
JP5/DFM 450,000 BBLs 2
DFM 796,000 BBLs 3
JP5 425,000 BBLs 2
JP8 2,496,000 BBLs 12
Total 4,167,000 BBLs 19














Source: Defense Energy Support Center
91
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
92
LIST OF REFERENCES
1999 Almanac, Defense Transportation Journal, v.55, no.2, pp. 13-14, 30-31, April 1999.
Caponiti, James, EUSC/NATO/VTA, brief presented to Maritime Administration,
Washington, DC, October 1999.
Defense Energy Support Center, DESC Corporate Brochure, Defense Logistics Agency
[http://www.desc.dla.mil/main/broc/brochure.pdf]. January- 2000.
Department of Transportation, An Assessment ofthe U.S. Marine Transportation System,
A Report to Congress
[http://www.dot.gov/mts/report]. 7 October 1999.
Holt, C.J., and Matthews, J.K., So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, United States
Transportation Command, 1996.
Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrinefor the Defense Transportation System, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 17 June 1997.
Joint Pub 4-01 .2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Sealift Support to Joint
Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996.
Kaskin, Jon, Information Brief: Combat Logistics Force, briefing for Naval Postgraduate
School, 9 December 1999.
Kennedy, J.M., 1999 Almanac Issue, Seapower, v.42, no.l, January 1999.
Kurz, Rob, Domestic Tanker Fleet, brief presented to Maritime Administration,
Washington, DC, October 1999.
Maritime Administration, MARAD 1998 Annual Report, National Security
[http://marad.dot.gov/CHPTOCl.htm]. 20 December 1999.
Michaelis, K.A., Satisfying War-Time Fuel Requirements With a Minimal Tanker
Complement, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monteey, California,
September, 1997.
Military Sealift Command, Ship Inventory, MSC Ships by Program
[http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/program.htm]. January 2000.
Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics, Chief ofNaval Operations, 10 January
1995.
93
Quintanilla, H.L., Product Fuel Tankers: Weakness in Strategic Readiness, Master's
Thesis, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1997.
Rost, R.F.,^4 Methodologyfor Projecting U.S. -Flag Commercial Tanker Capacity,
Center for Naval Anayses, Alexandria, VA, March 1986.
Rost, R.F., Sources ofTanker Tonnagefor Wartime Logistical Support: Projection ofthe
Commercial Fleet and the Ready Reserve Force, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria,
VA, September 1986.
Smith, B.E., The United States International Maritime Industry: Challenges to Sustaining
the Force, Master's Thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 3 June 1988.





1999 Almanac, Defense Transportation Journal, v.55, no.2, pp. 13-14, 30-31, April 1999.
Caponiti, James, EUSC/NATO/VTA, brief presented to Maritime Administration,
Washington, DC, October 1999.
Defense Energy Support Center, DESC Corporate Brochure, Defense Logistics Agency
[http://www.desc.dla.mil/main/broc/brochure.pdf]. January 2000.
Department of Transportation, An Assessment ofthe U.S. Marine Transportation System,
A Report to Congress
[http://www.dot.gov/mts/report]. 7 October 1999.
Herberger, A.J., VADM(Ret), The Maritime Security Act, Defense Transportation
Journal, v.53, no.2, pp. 10-1 1, April 1997.
Hessman, J.D. and Peterson, G.I., A Merchant Marine Fleet the Envy ofthe World: Ships,
Mariners, and Intermodal Transport, Seapower, v.42, no. 5, pp. 10- 15, May 1999.
Holt, C.J., and Matthews, J.K., So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, United States
Transportation Command, 1996.
Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrinefor the Defense Transportation System, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 17 June 1997.
Joint Pub 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Sealift Support to Joint
Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996.
Kaskin, Jon, Information Brief Combat Logistics Force, briefing for Naval Postgraduate
School, 9 December 1999.
Kennedy, J.M., 1999 Almanac Issue, Seapower, v.42, no.l, January 1999.
Kurz, Rob, Domestic Tanker Fleet, brief presented to Maritime Administration,
Washington, DC, October 1999.
Maritime Administration, MARAD 1998 Annual Report, National Security
[http://marad.dot.gov/CHPTOCl.htm]. 20 December 1999.
95
Michaelis, K.A., Satisfying War-Time Fuel Requirements With a Minimal Tanker
Complement, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monteey, California,
September, 1997.
Military Sealift Command, Ship Inventory, MSC Ships by Program
[http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/program.htm]. January 2000.
Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics, Chief ofNaval Operations, 10 January
1995.
Navy League, Maritime Issues and Challenges
[http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/seapower_maritime.htm]. 14 January 2000.
Navy League, The U.S. Flag-Merchant Marine: A Century in Review
[http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/us_flag_merchant_marine.htm]. 14 January 2000.
Quintanilla, H.L., Product Fuel Tankers: Weakness in Strategic Readiness, Master's
Thesis, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1997.
Rost, R.F., A Methodologyfor Projecting U.S.-Flag Commercial Tanker Capacity,
Center for Naval Anayses, Alexandria, VA, March 1986.
Rost, R.F., Sources ofTanker Tonnagefor Wartime Logistical Support: Projection ofthe
Commercial Fleet and the Ready Reserve Force, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria,
VA, September 1986.
Smith, B.E., The United States International Maritime Industry: Challenges to Sustaining
the Force, Master's Thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 3 June 1988.
Telephone conversation between Jeff Connolly, Tanker Project Office, Military Sealift
Command and the author, 27 January 2000.
Telephone conversation between CDR(Sel) William Wellman, DESC-BI, Defense
Energy Support Center and the author, 28 January 2000.
Telephone conversation between LCDR Mike Zimmerman, OPNAV N81 and the author,
31 Janaury2000.
Telephone conversation between Mel Geller, Maritime Administration and the author, 1
February 2000.
Telephone conversation between CDR Carolyn Kresek, OPNAV N42 and the author, 7
February 2000.
96
Telephone conversation between Kevin Tokarski, Maritime Administration Division of
Operations Support and the author, 9 February 2000.
Telephone conversation between Captain Robert Johnston, OSG Ship Management Inc.
and the author, 12 February 2000.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, A Report to Congress on
U.S. Maritime Policy
[http//marad.dot.gov/publications/policy98.pdf]. December 1 999.INITIAL
97





Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218




3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
Fort Lee, VA 23801-6043
4. Professor
,
LTC Rodney E.Tudor Code SM/TU 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. Professor Lee Edwards Code SM/LE 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
6. LCDR Thomas J. Keane 1
1 09 Brush Everard Court
Stafford, VA 22554
7. Mike Silvia 1
USTRANSCOM //TCJ5-AS//
Scott AFB, IL 62225
8. CDR(Sel) William H. Wellman 1.
Defense Energy Support Center
DESC-BI
8725 John J Kingman Road Suite 4950
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6222
9. MelGeller 1
Maritime Administration
Office of National Security Plans
MAR-620, Room PI -1303
400 7th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20590
99
10. Jeff Connolly PM51
Military Sealift Command
914 Charles Morris, Ct, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20398-6640





12. Captain Robert E. Johnston.
Executive Vice-President
OSG Ship Mangement, Inc.
511 5th Avenue
New York, NY 10017
100

G0 *T2321
B/02 22527-200 •«




